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WHO IS RESPONSIBLE FOR HOW EXECUTIVES BEHAVE?
Executive officers of companies work to maximize profits. For public
companies, the stock price is often connected to the direct actions taken by the
executive officers and dictates the health of the company. Executives who
allow a stock price to fall are often ousted in the hopes that a new leader can
reverse the company’s negative course. Yet some executives take this profit
drive to the extreme, utilizing illegal means to increase the profitability of their
company, and in turn, increasing their own wealth.1
The idea of corporate governance is broad—encompassing various actions
that officers and directors should take, documents that should be produced for
investors and shareholders, and outlines of company goals and initiatives
undertaken to increase future profitability. However, underlying all of the
corporate governance initiatives is the fundamental incentive to increase the
profitability of the company.
Does corporate governance also require that companies must monitor the
means their executives use to create profit? In industries where companies are
already breaking the rules, due to lackluster regulatory bodies,
disproportionally low enforcement, or insufficient incentivizing via fines, it is
acceptable to allow for socially responsible rule breaking?
If socially responsible rule breaking were allowable, who would decide the
limits? One might suggest that shareholders hold executives accountable.
However, this could give rise to potential abuse by shareholders to constantly
launch attacks against companies, with attorneys’ reaping significant amounts
of money in a process that seems to only benefit them, as is often the argument
with shareholder derivative suits.2
If we choose not to allow rule breaking, which is the likely path for most
members of society, should corporations have a duty to scrutinize the
behaviors of their executives, particularly if illegal means are utilized? One
solution explored below, and seen in food and drug law, is where criminal
liability may be an implication to prevent egregious social harm.3
1 Ethan Rome, Big Pharma CEOs Rake in $1.57 Billion in Pay, HUFFPOST BUS. (May 8, 2013, 8:19
AM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/ethan-rome/big-pharma-ceo-pay_b_3236641.html.
2 David G. Epstein et al., BUS. STRUCTURES 279 (West Academic Publishing, 4th ed. 2015).
3 United States v. Park, 421 U.S. 658, 669 (1975).

JAIN PERSPECTIVE GALLEYSFINAL

2016]

4/20/2016 11:09 AM

WHO IS RESPONSIBLE?

2059

I. ALLOWING RULE BREAKING
Some illegal actions are socially acceptable.4 Most drivers have surpassed
the speed limit and many pedestrians have jaywalked across a street. But how
far would society go in allowing corporate executives to break the law?
Currently laws are passed by the elected legislative branch and interpreted by
the judicial branch.5 If we permitted certain violations of the law, one
suggestion might be that companies within the industry regulate themselves
with a plan put in place after discussions with government overseers. An
example of this method might be compared to the Corporate Integrity
Agreements (“CIA”), which are self-policing mechanisms that pharmaceutical
companies sign to comply with the U.S. Department of Health and Human
Services’ policies after they have negotiated civil settlement agreements.6 The
CIAs are tailored to the company to try to address the specific facts of the case
where the pharmaceutical companies have violated a law.7 But one problem
with this solution would be enforcement, as the government would be
overburdened with the added regulatory responsibility of making sure that
companies are self-policing.8
Another suggestion might be to have auditors measure the impact of the
rule breaking to determine the impact of the violation and if it is acceptable.
This suggestion, however, is quite subjective as different parties have different
ways of measuring “acceptability” because one has to take in the impact on
human capital, the environment, industry, and money, among other things.9
II. SCRUTINIZING EXECUTIVES’ BEHAVIOR
Before the Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act of 1938, courts rationalized
dispensing the mens rea requirement and imposing a strict liability standard,
by stating that the statutory prohibition of the sale of liquor did not require
4 Christina Sterbenz, The 13 Most Commonly Broken Laws, BUS. INSIDER (Oct. 10, 2013, 6:15 PM),
http://www.businessinsider.com/most-commonly-broken-laws-in-america-2013-10.
5 The Judicial Branch, THE WHITE HOUSE, https://www.whitehouse.gov/1600/judicial-branch; The
Legislative Branch, THE WHITE HOUSE, https://www.whitehouse.gov/1600/legislative-branch.
6 OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN., Corporate Integrity Agreement FAQ, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN
SERVS., http://oig.hhs.gov/faqs/corporate-integrity-agreements-faq.asp (last visited Apr. 10, 2016).
7 OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN., supra note 6.
8 Breanna Holt, An Examination of Strict Criminal Liability Under the Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act of
1938: Is It Time For Change?, DIG. ACCESS TO SCHOLARSHIP AT HARV., 1999, at 27 , https://dash.harvard.edu/
bitstream/handle/1/8889485/Holt,_Breanna_-_Paper.pdf?sequence=1.
9 Daron Acemoglu & Matthew O. Jackson, Social Norms and Enforcement Laws, VOX (Sept. 19, 2014),
http://www.voxeu.org/article/social-norms-and-enforcement-laws.
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evidence that the seller/defendant knew or did not know the illegality of his
act.10 Throughout the 1860’s, this public welfare doctrine prevailed in many
states in cases involving food adulteration.11 In United States v. Dotterweich,
the Court reasoned that because corporations are intangible entities and must
act through people, those who are engaged in distributing adulterated or
misbranded drugs are strictly liable if they are in a “position of responsibility.”
12
Building off of that, in United States v. Park, the Court stated that “[t]he Act
imposes upon persons exercising supervisory responsibility reposed in them by
a business organization not only a positive duty to seek out and remedy
violations but also, and primarily a duty to implement measures that will insure
that violations do not occur.”13
Since Dotterweich and Park, researchers have questioned whether the
threat of criminal liability serves as an adequate deterrent.14 This is the most
often cited rationale for imposing criminal liability on corporate executives
that fall within the scope of the definition.15 However, there is no evidence that
personal criminal liability is an effective deterrent.16 Arguments opposing the
use of strict personal liability include: (1) that is is unjust; (2) that other
mechanisms could be used to protect the public welfare; (3) that is it unfair to
subject people to possible criminal punishment where the requirements of the
Act are not clear; (4) that the deterrent purpose is not a satisfactory rationale if
the defendant exercised reasonable care and was unaware of the violation; and
(5) that the government might require companies to conform to a higher
standard not required by the law with simply the threat of criminal
prosecution.17
Criminal prosecution of corporate executives is more likely if the alleged
offender “was previously notified of suspected violations and thereafter
refused to correct the offending conduct . . . [,or] if the violation was
intentional, easily detectable, preventable, fraudulent, or life threatening.”18

10

Holt, supra note 8, at 3.
Id.
12 United States v. Dotterweich, 320 U.S. 277, 284 (1943).
13 United States v. Park, 421 U.S. 658, 658–59 (1975) (syllabus).
14 Holt, supra note 8; Vandya Swaminathan & Matthew Avery, FDA Enforcement of Criminal Liability
for Clinical Investigator Fraud, 4:2 HASTINGS SCI. AND TECH. L. J. 325 (2012).
15 Holt, supra note 8, at 27.
16 Id. at 28.
17 Id. at 28–29.
18 Holt, supra note 8, at 30.
11
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However, there is no concrete definition of who qualifies as a “reasonable
person,” which makes criminal liability a real threat for corporate executives.19
Another method to curb corporate executives’ urge to use illegal means is
to bar executives from participating within the industry. Debarment is used by
the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) when executives have been
convicted of crimes “relating to heath care fraud.”20 The debarment
consequence applies if an executive has been convicted of a violation of the
Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act that relates to the approval or regulation of a
drug product.21 Debarment can occur in addition to imprisonment or a fine.22
Disallowing an executive to continue to practice within that industry would
seemingly limit one’s job prospects, which could also serve as a deterrent.
Ultimately, the issue with both criminal prosecution and debarment is that the
use of these tools hinge on the enforcement power of the FDA and the
Department of Justice.
The last option is ever present: to accept a reduction in profits in order to
ensure that the company is in complete compliance with the law and is not too
far into the gray zone. This, however, can be detrimental for a company
because this risk-adverse approach is antithetical to the traditional business
ideology of taking risks to increase the potential for profit windfalls. This then
becomes a strategic decision. How long should corporations accept profit
losses in order to comply with laws and regulations, without adversely
impacting the company?
CONCLUSION
Ultimately, executive behavior is difficult to control. Executives are
constantly driven to raise company profits in order to maintain their positions,
and deterrent methods are limited. While the strict liability standard is present
in the food and drug industries, it would be a slippery slope to extend the
public welfare argument to all corporations. Additionally, there is little
justification for debarment because a conviction has to be present before that
action is taken. This ultimately leads back to the issue of enforcement and the
difficulty in proving inappropriate or illegal executive behavior. It is likely that
many companies will allow executives to explore in the gray area so long as
19
20
21
22

Id. at 30–31.
42 U.S.C. § 1320(a) (2010).
Id.
Id.
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they continue to increase company profits without increasing company
liability.
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